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INTRODUCTION: ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 
AND THE GERMAN QUESTION
[A]t my very fi rst entrance upon the task, an intricate diffi  culty did in a manner 
wholly discourage me. For I lighted upon great piles and heaps of papers and writ-
ings of all sorts, reasonably well digested indeed in respect of the times, but in regard 
of the variety of the arguments very much confused. In searching and turning over 
whereof whilst I laboured till I sweat again, covered all over with dust, to gather fi t 
matter together … I procured all the helps I possibly could for writing it.1
For the bringing of which into this homely and rough-hewen shape, which here thou 
seest, what restleße nights, what painefull dayes, what heat, what cold I haue indured; 
how many long & chargeable iourneys I haue traueiled; how many famous libraries I 
haue searched into; what varietie of ancient and modern writers I haue perused; what 
a number of old records, patents, priuileges, letters, &c. I haue redeemed from obscu-
ritie and perishing; into how manifold acquaintance I haue entred; what expenses I 
haue not spared; and yet what faire opportunities of priuate gaine, preferment, and 
ease I haue neglected.2
William Camden and Richard Hakluyt had gift s for overstatement. Addressing 
English history at the end of Elizabeth’s reign, they confronted enormous stores 
public and private of government rolls, documents and materials of all sorts. 
In many ways they succeeded in assembling these papers into comprehensible 
narratives explaining how and why events occurred. Modern historians of Eliza-
bethan England fi nd themselves burdened with the same task of understanding 
the evidence and producing sensible analyses. Th e nature and amount of sources 
depend upon the questions asked. For the German question, that source base is 
considerable. Camden and Hakluyt have our sympathies.
Th e German Question
Central to the German question is how the Elizabethan regime would engage 
their confessional brethren in the Holy Roman Empire and overcome the prob-
lems confronted in that relationship. Indeed, what was that relationship to be? 
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For English leadership at the start of the reign in 1558, England’s prior associa-
tion with German Protestants was a good but dated start. Henry VIII’s dealings 
with Lutherans of the Schmalkaldic League experienced auspicious beginnings 
during the 1530s only to become mired in conservatism and stagnated in diplo-
macy the next decade.3 Following Mary’s death and Elizabeth’s accession, the 
confessional considerations of English Protestants were driven by both domes-
tic concerns such as the Settlement of Religion and England’s position vis-à-vis 
other Protestant groups. For Elizabeth, her Principal Secretary, William Cecil, 
and others with relevant experience, the most sensible and favoured group of 
potential allies were in the Empire. For religious and political reasons, during the 
1550s English and German Protestants looked to each other for their individual 
and mutual security in an increasingly tense environment. From the English 
perspective, having the Protestant Princes of Germany as associates added an 
international and historical pedigree to England’s religious identity, and the 
Princes could be called upon as diplomatic and military allies to oppose Catho-
lic powers in France and Spain. From the German perspective, an anti-Catholic 
English sovereign and Settlement off ered the same assurances, with the added 
element that England would serve as the political head of a Protestant league. 
Th e relationship between Elizabethan England and Germany is not a new 
fi eld of study. In fact, the German question is an old one. Camden long ago rec-
ognized the confessional alliance, and ever since scholars have acknowledged 
many of the eff orts and correspondence. Among historians of England, very 
much or very little has been made of the sources. Depending upon biases and 
points of origin, the Elizabethan Church and State have been seen as either 
wholeheartedly in line with Lutheran tenets or entirely of their own creation 
and therefore unique. A third line of argument has stressed neither confessional 
pole and ignored the German question, proff ering instead the Calvinist charac-
ter of Elizabethan England.4
Overstatement for English affi  nity with Lutheranism is easy: Elizabeth forged 
a ‘middle way’ between Rome and Geneva, and that via media ran through the 
Wittenberg of Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon. It follows, then, that 
the Elizabethan Church assumed German theological positions and retained 
the trappings of Lutheran ceremonies and appearances. In this light, Elizabeth’s 
motivations for engaging the Protestant Princes are clear, but the issue becomes 
more complex when the ambiguities of English doctrinal positions are evaluated 
and the diffi  culties of the Queen’s relationship with the Germans uncovered. 
Aft er all, Elizabeth was not a Lutheran; nor was William Cecil. Indeed, there 
were few outright Lutherans in England during this period.5
A similarly exaggerated case is the insularity of the Church and State: Henry 
VIII’s break from Rome set a path for Anglicanism to forge its own identity, and 
as Supreme Governor Elizabeth followed in her father’s footsteps by choosing 
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none of the European Protestant options and reached her own ‘English’ Settle-
ment. Accordingly, the Queen wanted nothing to do with politically dangerous 
Calvinists in Geneva and little regarded Lutherans of Germany. Th is conception 
of the Church and State is correct insofar as it ascertains the peculiar situation, 
but driving a deep wedge between England and the mainland has become a dated 
argument. Th e web of Elizabethan connections, theological and diplomatic, to 
Protestants elsewhere has shown otherwise.6
More recently, deeper investigations of Tudor and early Stuart England con-
sider the role played by Protestants in Swiss lands and suggest a wide-ranging 
and general consensus on Calvinist theological and social teachings.7 Elizabe-
than Puritanism was a product of the returning Marian exiles, it is supposed, 
and English correspondence with divines like Heinrich Bullinger and Th eodore 
Beza ensured the continuation of a Swiss model for English doctrinal positions 
and austerity. Certainly, many later leaders of the Elizabethan Church were of a 
Genevan persuasion and used Jean Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
while several counsellors and formulators of policy advocated thoroughgoing 
militancy and intervention on behalf of the French and Dutch Reformed com-
munities. Th is interpretation rightly acknowledges the Elizabethan debt to the 
European mainland but privileges the Swiss Churches’ connections to the detri-
ment of any German element.8
If variety of opinion on England’s domestic character has muddied the 
waters, the Germans’ role in foreign aff airs has been left  relatively clear. In 
Anglophone scholarship, studies of Elizabethan foreign policy have largely dis-
counted or omitted entirely the Protestant Princes of Germany. Although some 
work highlights particular individuals or moments, none assesses the spectrum 
of Protestantism in the Empire and the Queen’s dealings for the length of her 
reign. Th e neglect of the German question is partially due to the proportional 
dominance of French, Spanish and Dutch aff airs in the English State Papers. 
Without doubt, Elizabeth needed to address the concerns of France and the 
Spanish Netherlands because of their geographical proximity to English shores. 
Accordingly, the sources readily available are as voluminous as they are instruc-
tive of domestic impulses and forces within the English State. By comparison, 
because of the seemingly defi cient sources on Germany in London archives, Ger-
man aff airs are oft en assumed to be of corresponding insignifi cance.9
German scholarship on the Princes’ relations with England, however, has in 
some ways moved forward. Using regional archives and English sources in the 
printed calendars of the nineteenth century, a few studies evaluate Elizabeth’s 
engagement with particular leaders or during key episodes. Sound research in 
Dresden, for example, documents her political relations with Elector Augustus 
of Saxony. Augustus, the richest and most powerful Protestant Prince, was a 
symbolic and practical centrepiece for many of the Queen’s plans for a confes-
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sional alliance, but he was also hesitant to commit to anything that might aff ect 
the shaky balance in the Empire. Similarly good work illustrates the wide-rang-
ing foreign relations of the Count Palatine, Johann Casimir, as he was one of the 
most active and enthusiastic military allies of the English during the wars of reli-
gion in France and the Netherlands. More recent eff orts in Germany have shown 
the wider repercussions of Lutheran theological disputes and how diff erent areas 
received divisive ideas coming from theologians such as Jakob Andreae.10 Studies 
in German, therefore, shed light on Elizabethan relations with Protestant Ger-
many and signal the promise of research in both British and German archives.
Th e Argument
Th e following examination of Elizabethan England’s relationship with the 
Protestant Princes of the Holy Roman Empire is the widest and deepest to 
date. Incorporating English and German sources and scholarship, the analysis 
recounts some familiar events and personalities, but it also brings to light mate-
rials previously unknown or underutilized. Th e cumulative weight of evidence 
in manuscript and print brings England and Reformation Germany closer than 
ever before. Th e argument is both simple and complex. On one hand, the State 
and Church of England were fi rmly attached to the Protestant sensibilities and 
anti-Catholicism of their confessional allies in Germany and Denmark; this 
domestic affi  nity produced an openness in foreign policy to collaborate with the 
Princes on matters of international signifi cance. On the other hand, the story 
does not rest solely upon affi  nity and openness. 
Th e Elizabethan regime’s attraction to and connections with Protestant 
Germania were consistent from beginning to end, but they also encountered a 
series of diffi  culties coming from both sides of the Channel. During the early 
years of the reign, many English leaders had had some of the same experiences 
as Protestants in Germany. Th e highs of evangelical hopes during the 1530s 
and 1540s, in England as in Germany, were dashed by the political realities and 
counterattacks of the 1550s. Th is common history was part of a budding sense 
of international Protestantism, a process and character that reached full fl ower 
decades later. By 1570, it was clear an Anglo-German alliance would be com-
plicated due to English hesitation and the varying personalities and political 
situations in the Empire. Princes in the Palatinate, Hesse, Denmark and else-
where, for example, worked with English leadership signifi cantly more than 
those in Saxony, Brandenburg and Württemberg. Diff erences on foreign policy 
among the Princes were partially due to their relative proximities to confl icts in 
France and the Netherlands, but additional diffi  culties (or opportunities) could 
arise aft er the passing of one generation to the next in these lands. During the 
later 1570s, theological disputes among German Protestants solidifi ed existing 
C rig
 Introduction 5
divides between rivalling factions. Th e result, the Formula of Concord, formally 
condemned those outside the ‘orthodox’ Lutheran Church and represented a 
watershed in Anglo-German relations, but it did not shut the door to the his-
toric friendship. During the 1580s and early 1590s, Elizabethan England and 
the Protestant Princes came together again and again. Towards the end of the 
reign, rather than theological or political obstacles breaking the Anglo-German 
axis, biological necessities for all intents and purposes ended the story in 1592. 
Within a span of twelve months, a generation of German Protestant leaders 
died, leaving heirs too young and states too fragile to continue working with 
Elizabeth for causes greater than themselves. Over the reign, fundamental to 
continuous collaboration with allies in Germany and Denmark was the English 
desire for maintaining a lasting friendship and mutual identity opposed to their 
Catholic adversaries.
Diversity among Protestants in the Empire presented problems for the Eliza-
bethan regime, but such snags were temporary and eventually overcome. English 
experience with Germans was not limited to simple or occasional correspond-
ence. Indeed, a wide variety of contacts in and ambassadors to greater Germania 
kept the Queen and her counsellors well informed on developments and how 
she could adapt to changing situations. Intelligence from place to place varied in 
importance, but the patterns emerging from English operations in the Empire 
demonstrated Elizabeth’s commitment to her allies. In fact, just as openness dur-
ing the early years led to the formulation of a policy to incorporate Protestant 
Germania, the implementation of that policy revealed religious sensibilities at 
both the Queen’s Court and the Princes’. As such, in each land the domestic situ-
ations and foreign policies were in some ways mirrors. For the modern observer 
the German question demonstrates England’s broad and sustained interest in 
maintaining a working alliance with international Protestantism in general, and 
it off ers an entry point for assessing English collaboration with Lutherans and 
the later German Reformed.
Chapter 1 investigates the early connections between the nascent regime and 
Protestant Germany. For the domestic situation, it suggests the Settlement of 
Religion is best understood in a long chronological context and highlights the 
deliberate ambiguity that represented the Queen’s open-door policy towards 
Protestants of mainland Europe. In foreign aff airs, chapter 1 details Elizabeth’s 
earliest marital and diplomatic interactions with the Lutherans of Germany and 
Denmark. Chapters 2 to 5 move chronologically from the early 1560s to the 
early 1590s. Showing highs and lows from year to year (in some cases, day to 
day), they chart the underlying consistency behind English policy towards the 
Protestants of the Empire. Th e titular theme of these chapters, Foedus et Fractio, 
implies the great challenge for the period: implementing the Queen’s policy for 
the Anglo-German alliance, despite the potential for permanent division among 
those opposed to Roman Catholicism. 
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Sources and Terms
Th e sources of early modern England and its foreign policy are generally known, 
but for the German question they have been insuffi  ciently excavated. Th e well-
worn series of edited calendars and collections of state papers are key starting 
points, but they are just that, starting rather than endpoints.11 Th e calendars 
summarize documents from repositories in London and elsewhere, but these 
synopses are uneven in detail and sometimes omit sections relevant to the pre-
sent study. To overcome these defi ciencies, recourse to original manuscripts has 
been the modus operandi whenever possible. Detailed examination of every orig-
inal is sometimes unnecessary or impractical, so this study occasionally relies on 
editions and abstracts.
In addition to printed calendars, edited collections and the state papers 
behind them, additional stores supply an array of sources. Further researches 
have shed light into multiple collections in the British Library, Hatfi eld House, 
Lambeth Palace Library, university libraries in Oxford, Cambridge and Aber-
deen, and in the United States. Th ese materials illuminate English relations 
with Germany and include diplomatic instructions, royal out-letters to foreign 
powers, theological treatises and personal memoranda. Manuscripts are the core 
source base, but printed items are brought forward to demonstrate the wider sig-
nifi cance of German aff airs in England. For reasons of space, citations to printed 
editions have been omitted where preference is given to the original.12
To avoid an overly Anglocentric perspective, this study incorporates mate-
rials from Germany and Denmark. Apart from Kouri’s broad research over 
three decades ago, it represents the fi rst major investigation of these regional 
archives for Elizabethan studies.13 Th e narrative here corroborates Kouri’s eff orts 
by documenting the depth of sources and potential boon to historians of early 
modern Europe. As more recent works by McEntegart and Lockhart show, 
many archives in Germany and Denmark contain records relevant to British 
aff airs and wider European developments. Among these repositories, the most 
valuable are in Munich, Stuttgart, Dresden, Hannover, Marburg, Wolfenbüttel, 
Berlin-Dahlem and Copenhagen; as will be found in the notes, the materials in 
these archives help to fi ll in gaps left  by even the deepest research in British col-
lections. As with printed editions of British sources, previous German historians 
collected and edited much of the correspondence by key German Princes.14 Th e 
same practice has been adopted for these items, where investigation of the origi-
nal manuscripts has been made when possible, and preference in the notes has 
been aff orded to originals over other versions. Finally, as with English sources, 
German printed works are cited where relevant and show how widely publicized 
British aff airs became during the period. 
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Several terms and ideas recur throughout the following chapters and deserve 
clarifi cation. ‘Conservative Protestantism’ is understood as a mindset or ten-
dency to identify with older forms of English Protestantism that bore loose 
affi  nities and/or cooperated with reform movements in Saxony, Hesse and 
elsewhere in Germany. ‘Conservative’ is sometimes associated with ‘traditional’, 
‘old-fashioned’ or ‘classic’ Protestant ideas of the 1530s and 1540s fundamen-
tally opposed to Catholicism and looking to reform its abuses and theological 
interpretations. Th ese convictions also harboured a sense of moderation due 
to lessons learned during the Radical and early Swiss Reformations. Lutheran 
ideas of reform were technically little ‘older’ than Zwinglian ones, but among 
English Protestants the early relative dominance of the German Reformation is 
distinguished from the later Swiss ascendancy among the Marian exiles and later 
English theologians. Moderate notions of reform included the ceremonial obser-
vance of the Eucharist with the laity in both kinds and with the preservation of a 
sense (if ambiguous) of the Real Presence of Christ. Th ese ideas resonated with 
the practices of English Protestants during the Reformation under Henry VIII 
and were distinct from the Swiss practices of using a simple table for the Eucha-
rist, which was understood in a purely symbolic or fi gurative manner. Also, 
‘conservative’ or ‘old-fashioned’ Protestants held a view of the Church’s structure 
retaining the hierarchy of bishops (i.e. episcopi, overseers, or as the Lutherans 
had it, superintendents) without recognizing the bishop of Rome as the supreme 
Archbishop. Ecclesiological conservation diff ered from those advocating a less 
hierarchical system (as in Calvin’s Geneva and Presbyterian Scotland). Finally, 
Protestants of a conservative mindset, particularly during Elizabeth’s early reign, 
appreciated the troubled history of religious war, persecution and the associ-
ated political compromises of the 1540s and 1550s. Indeed, English Protestants 
who survived the years under Mary (1553–8) as Nicodemites, such as William 
Cecil, Matthew Parker, Roger Ascham and the Queen, could identify with the 
accommodations made by Philip Melanchthon and other Lutherans during 
the Interim (1548–55). At a deeper level, some who privately held rather Swiss 
ideas in their personal correspondence embraced in their public proceedings a 
pan-Protestant attitude of cooperation and solidarity with Lutherans of a more 
conservative mould. Of this ilk were John Jewel, Henry Killigrew and Daniel 
Rogers. In sum, conservative Protestants looked to conserve and maintain many 
original goals of the Reformation, but without advancing so far as to jeopardize 
existing ecclesiastical structures or alienate a populace that had weathered the 
storm of the mid-Tudor years.
‘International Protestantism’ refl ects the idea that the movement was not 
limited to any one nation but rather occurred in many places, and that across 
Europe those opposed to Catholicism had a common religious identity. Within 
those territories, some Protestants were uniquely concerned with their own 
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religio-political situations, while others saw their confl icts as integral to a wider 
pan-European phenomenon. Many leaders – English, German or otherwise 
– were of this international mindset in that they recognized geopolitical bounda-
ries from one country to the next, but they also understood individual wars as 
components of a greater struggle. A related but more concrete entity, the ‘Prot-
estant International’ refers to the body of political organizers and religious heads 
who collaborated with each other during periods of relative peace and moved 
into action by mobilizing forces at other times. Among English leaders, Queen 
Elizabeth, Secretary Cecil and the ambassador-cum-Clerk of the Privy Council 
Robert Beale were representative of those appreciating diff erences from one con-
fl ict to the next but seeing each country as a potential political domino, which, if 
it fell, could lead to the toppling of the whole collaborative. Of Protestant leader-
ship in the Empire, at various times those in Württemberg, Zweibrücken, Hesse, 
Brunswick and Denmark were of this outlook – of distinct yet inseparable causes.
‘International Protestantism’ and ‘Protestant International’ are not the same 
as ‘international Calvinism’ or ‘Calvinist internationalism’, because the former 
refl ect the multinational political impact, whereas the latter emphasize a trans-
national ideology superseding political boundaries. Calvinist and Reformed 
communities understood their battles in France, the Netherlands and else-
where as indicators of a singular, apocalyptic cosmic struggle. Accordingly, their 
transnational organization was considered an ideological imperative, not just a 
gesture of religious sympathy and fear of dominoes.15 Leaders of a transnational 
bent in England included Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, and Francis Walsing-
ham, Principal Secretary. In the Empire, political heads in the Palatinate, Saxony 
and Anhalt could sometimes be characterized as such.
‘Th e Protestant cause’ is borrowed from the study of the same name and sim-
ilarly acknowledged as the general convictions and activities of those opposed 
to Roman Catholicism and its political manifestations.16 Th e ‘cause’ was man-
ifested in several ways, ranging from political or diplomatic manoeuvrings to 
dissuade others from recognizing the decrees of the Council of Trent, to military 
organization to defend those under assault. In its international reifi cations, the 
‘cause’ was most conspicuous in the language used by those advocating fi rm and 
consistent intervention across political boundaries. Th e term, however, applies 
no less to an intranational context, where it could refl ect the desire to settle con-
fessional issues within one’s own domestic policy. During the reign of Elizabeth, 
the ‘cause’ was most apparent on the international level across Britain, France 
and the Low Countries, while on the national level it also appeared within the 
Holy Roman Empire.
Clarifi cation of terms relative to German aff airs may help readers coming 
from a predominantly British background. ‘Germany’ is technically a modern 
political entity, but the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation incorpo-
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rated and self-identifi ed as such from 1512 forward. Along these lines but on a 
wider scale, ‘Germania’ is accounted as the regions spreading from modern Aus-
tria and German-speaking Switzerland to Denmark and Sweden. Within these 
lands, the dominant religious confession among Protestants was the Confession 
of Augsburg, which was usually understood as the original (1530) or Variata 
version (1540). Diff erences between the editions created heated debates, but in 
general when the Confession arose in English and German correspondence, the 
original of 1530 was described variously as ‘Augustana’, ‘Augsburg’, ‘Auspurch’, 
‘Auspurg’ or ‘Augspurg’. In later Reformation Germany, the two major branches 
of the Lutheran Church were those claiming to be the true or strict followers 
of Luther, ‘Gnesio-Lutherans’, and those adhering to a fl exible path of religio-
political realism à la Philip Melanchthon, ‘Philippists’.17 Elizabethan leadership 
understood these divisions and sought to reconcile their diff erences along with 
the development during the 1560s and 1570s of a third branch, the ‘Reformed’. 
Centred at Heidelberg, the Reformed Church of the Palatinate created its own 
catechism and model of austerity, and certainly nodded in the direction of Cal-
vin’s Geneva, but it remained within the legal confi nes of the Confession of 
Augsburg (and therefore the Peace of Augsburg recognizing Lutheranism as a 
permitted religion in the Empire). Some may assert the Palatinate was the prime 
example of a Calvinist territory just as they apply ‘Calvinist’ to the Netherlands, 
but the term is less applicable to the situation during the sixteenth century than 
the seventeenth.18 Th ough affi  nities existed between Heidelberg and Geneva 
or Zürich, the Palatinate of the 1560s to 1590s was still within Augustana and 
recognized as such by Elizabeth and her counsellors. As will be seen, English 
intelligence was surprisingly regular and accurate when evaluating the territories 
and personalities of greater Germania.
Assessing the Holy Roman Empire
In 1667 Samuel von Pufendorf called Germany ‘an irregular body and like some 
mis-shapen monster’ relative to other European states. As he saw it, the Empire 
was a confederate system of sovereign states with one superior prince, had both 
strengths and weaknesses, and constituted a confusing amalgam of territories 
and administrative systems. More recently a variety of descriptions has emerged, 
but as Wilson points out, the Empire was sometimes a monarchy while at others 
a federation or hierarchy, and these ideas were not mutually exclusive.19 Regard-
less of its constitutional development, Germany’s key institutions, territories 
and fi gureheads are clear. With remarkable accuracy, Elizabethan foreign policy 
leaders knew how the Empire worked (and how it did not) and kept up with 
changing situations due to intelligence from ambassadors and resident agents.
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To remain informed, the Elizabethan regime almost always had representa-
tives at Imperial meetings, Reichstage, and oft en had agents at lesser conferences 
like the Kurfürstentag, Fürstentag, Kreisetag and Deputationstag.20 From these 
meetings the English learned the shift ing balances between the Emperor and 
Princes, and among the Princes themselves. Over the course of the sixteenth cen-
tury, regional Princes acted with an increasing degree of political and religious 
autonomy, and accordingly Elizabeth’s policy balanced its priorities between 
honouring the dignity of the Habsburg Emperors and addressing the practicali-
ties of the Princes. Th eir relative autonomy stemmed from the Peace of Augsburg 
in 1555, when the principle of cuius regio eius religio ensured each ruler could 
decide religious policy in his territories.21 Th e Princes’ ability to determine the 
confession of each region, sometimes without restraint from the Emperor,22 led 
to a complicated political and religious geography that could change from one 
generation to the next. Remaining current on such developments could be a dif-
fi cult task, but the English diplomatic corps kept its leadership informed.
One particularly illuminating analysis suffi  ces to show the regime’s deep 
knowledge of the Empire. During Henry Killigrew’s mission to Germany in 1569 
to garner aid for Huguenots and forge a Protestant league, an unnamed attendant 
assembled an impressive description of the state of Germany. His report included 
assessments of the political and religious situations in the Palatinate, Saxony 
and elsewhere. Although the author did not travel to all the Circles (Kreise, or 
administrative subunits) of the Empire, he amassed information that could act as 
a handbook for later English legations.23 More suggestive is the report’s detail on 
leaders in each area and their contribution (in foot and horse) for all necessary 
aff airs. Th e account amounted to a ‘Who’s Who’ for sixteenth-century Germany. 
Th e evaluation of Imperial territories was highly relevant to English interests 
because of the potential support they might lend to Protestants elsewhere, but the 
fi ner focus of the English regime was usually on particular territories like Saxony, 
the Palatinate, Hesse and Holstein (of which the King of Denmark was Duke). 
Elizabeth sometimes looked to additional lands like Württemberg, Zweibrücken 
and Brunswick when friendly Princes like Dukes Christopher, Wolfgang and Julius 
were in power, but generational shift s in these less powerful places oft en meant a 
reliance on those in Saxony and the Palatinate.24 
Saxony was perennially important to Elizabethan diplomacy in Germany. 
Because of its natural resources and trade, the Saxon economy was consist-
ently strong and provided the Elector with tax revenues envied by other Princes 
and scorned by his subjects. Indeed, as noted in 1569 by Killigrew’s attendant, 
Elector Augustus was ‘[o]f all the princes in Germany … the richest and of the 
greatest power both of men & money’, but he was ‘hated of his nobilitie and 
gentlemen’ for his commercial practices and continual acquisition of lands from 
Johann Friedrich II, Duke of Saxony and rival claimant to the Electorship. So 
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hated was Augustus that fi ve years earlier Secretary Cecil learned he had been 
attacked by his own keeper of the forests (though the circumstances remain 
unclear).25 Despite a tetchy relationship with his subjects, the Elector of Saxony 
exercised powerful infl uence over other Protestant Princes, particularly the Elec-
tor of Brandenburg, and was accordingly a key fi gure to involve in an alliance 
against Catholic aggression.26
Th e Palatinate was equally if not more important to English eff orts. Th e 
most dominant German Princes in close proximity to confl icts in France and 
the Netherlands, Palatine powers were crucial allies of Elizabeth for nearly the 
entire reign. Elector Friedrich III was a confessional stalwart for the Protestant 
cause, and it should be stressed that although the reformation of his lands tilted 
toward Swiss interpretations of theology and ritual, it could still be understood 
to adhere in a broad sense to the Confession of Augsburg. Electoral Heidelberg 
could accordingly act as a mediator between Saxony and Switzerland, or as Zuck 
puts it, ‘[t]he Heidelberg approach sought to maintain continuity between the 
heart of Lutheranism and the heart of Calvinism’.27 
Protestant rulers in Hesse, Denmark and elsewhere were similarly important 
to Elizabeth’s German policy. Accordingly, the English regime remained well 
informed on political and religious developments in these lands. Also signifi cant, 
however, were reports sent back to London regarding Catholic powers in the 
Empire. Indeed, the Queen, Cecil and others learned of the personalities among 
Catholics like the Duke of Bavaria, Albert V, and the Holy Roman Emper-
ors Ferdinand I, Maximilian II and Rudolf II.28 Duke Albert’s involvement in 
Catholic conspiracies against Protestantism was clear to Cecil, who noted in the 
mid-1560s that a league between the Pope, Emperor, Duke of Bavaria and oth-
ers aimed to depose the Protestant Electors Friedrich and Augustus, and in their 
places put Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles. Cecil gathered the inventor of the 
league was the Cardinal of Lorraine and Albert was appointed commander of 
Catholic forces to overtake Protestant lands.29 Albert’s successor, Wilhelm V, 
was similarly esteemed to be the most signifi cant Catholic Prince apart from 
the Emperor, and his role in the Cologne War of the 1580s showed the English 
he was ‘the greatest prince in all Germany of that faccion’.30 Th e tense anxiety 
of the period drove Catholics into thinking Protestants were the ones confed-
erating to advance their own agendas. It was certainly true that Bavaria was in 
correspondence with a wide circle of international Catholics, so Protestant con-
spiracy theorists were partially right, but in some measure these contacts were 
anticipatory of possible threat and, therefore, expressions of cyclical nervousness 
common to both sides.31 
Because of these complex overlapping territories and rivalries, foreign pow-
ers had to account for political and religious diff erences across the Empire. Th ese 
distinctions, especially between the Rhenish Palatinate and Saxony, were some-
Copyrigh
12 Anglo-German Relations and the Protestant Cause
times so great that no power, not even the Emperor, could bring them together 
on all points. English policy, rather than blindly approach the Protestant Princes 
as a single or uniform group, recognized the variances and adjusted accordingly. 
Kouri claims Elizabeth’s rather incoherent policy was oversimplifi ed and had 
little understanding of the Princes’ religious positions, but the assertion is con-
founded by evidence showing, in fact, there was no shortage of information on 
the Princes and their counsellors.32 When her German policy was put into eff ect, 
English representatives appreciated the theological viewpoints from place to 
place. Furthermore, even if a tendency to address German Protestants as a single 
group did exist, that body was understood to be anti-Catholic at its core but with 
a measure of variation similar to the spectrum of opinion between conservative 
Protestants and zealous Puritans in England.33 When Elizabeth sent her agents 
into the fi eld, they had up-to-date intelligence on the most approachable German 
Protestant powers and consulted with her best friends, who then widened the 
cause among their compatriots. As will be seen, this became the standard prac-
tice for Elizabethan diplomacy to Germany. Within these territories, the Queen’s 
allies worked with English diplomats who sent back dispatches including item-
ized lists and character evaluations of additional Princes and their counsellors.34
In part, Pufendorf was right. Th e Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation was neither a straightforward monarchy as in England nor a republic as 
in Venice. Rather, it was a loose confederation of territories stretching from Italy 
to Denmark and from Bohemia to Burgundy. Th roughout these lands powerful 
families competed for political dominance and religious autonomy. In addition 
to territorial and dynastic contingencies, the age of confessionalization added a 
new ideological component that crossed traditional boundaries. No longer could 
onlookers view German regional confl icts in complete isolation; no longer did 
English policy treat the Empire as a single body. To every Imperial Diet or other 
major meeting of the Protestant Princes, Elizabeth and her Council either sent 
her own representatives or called upon resident agents to relay news and confer 
with allies.35 Th us, for all the complexity, Elizabethan leadership had a solid and 
evolving base of intelligence. Th en and now, compiling this information – from 
offi  cial embassies, private correspondence and printed material – was surely a 
momentous task and showed the Empire was an intricate entity, but (pace Pufen-
dorf ) it was no monster.
In foreign policy studies of Elizabethan England most attention is aff orded 
to the usual suspects in France, Spain and the Netherlands. Th e edition of two 
treatises on the state of France during the 1580s is evidence of the success of Eng-
lish intelligence in this regard.36 Sixteenth-century knowledge of foreign aff airs 
was of course not as standardized as modern information gathering, but the Eliz-
abethan regime started out with a good deal of experienced statesmen in 1558 
and continued to learn the contours of German religio-politics as they evolved. 
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Moreover, chief formulators of policy knew their political equivalents in foreign 
Courts and corresponded accordingly. Representatives like Robert Beale held 
important contacts all over the Empire, and the surviving records show their 
activity and eff ect. Over the course of the reign, an ever-increasing amount of 
detail on the Empire began to fl ow into English printed publications. Indeed, 
by 1600 facts formerly reserved for the Queen and Council in 1560 entered the 
public domain so more might know the state of Germany.37
As it happened, aff airs in Germany would get still more complicated in the 
coming years, such that none might keep up. In 1615, shortly before the out-
break of the Th irty Years’ War, Maurice, Landgrave of Hesse, wrote:
I am very much afraid that the states of the Empire, quarrelling fi ercely among them-
selves, may start a fatal confl agration embracing not only themselves … but also all 
those countries that are in one way or another connected with Germany. All this will 
undoubtedly produce the most dangerous consequences, bringing about the total 
collapse and unavoidable alteration in the present state of Germany. And it may also 
perhaps aff ect some other states.38
A similar statement had been expressed decades before. Just fi ve years into Eliza-
beth’s reign, English observation of the deteriorating situation in the north-west 
of the Empire called to mind an old analogy that applied as much to the unity of 
the German Princes as to the solidarity of the Protestant International:
[I]f the Imperiall Princes will iustly consider … the example of that wise man whoe 
being sicke a little before his death commaunded all his sonnes into his presence, and 
had prepared a bundle of weake stickes. ffi  rst deliuered to the eldest sonne to take 
the bundle, who willed him to breake, which hee prooued [tried] to doe but he was 
not able; Th en he commaunded the second sonne to take the bundle, who likewise 
prooued and was not able; and soe all the rest of his sonnes one aft er another, and 
none of them of himselfe was able to breake this bundle. Th en the ff ather did cause 
the bandes of this bundle to be broken and deliuered to euery one of his sonnes a 
sticke, and bade them prooue if they could breake them, which before his face euery 
one broke his sticke, of it selfe being weake, was not soe strong as the bundle bound 
togeather.39
Th is was a wise tale to consider not just in 1564. Th e notion of binding together 
to withstand the enemy would be at the heart of Elizabeth’s eff orts to build an 
Anglo-German confederation for decades to come.
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